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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 890081-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Category No. 2

JOHN TIMOTHY SINGER,
Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

POINT I
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
CONVICTION FOR THE OFFENSE OF MANSLAUGHTER.
Appellee correctly states the standard that this court
is to employ
Appellee

in reviewing

contends

conviction.

that

the

the sufficiency

of

issue was never

the evidence.

raised

following

However, the sufficiency of the evidence was raised

at the end of the State's case and denied by the trial court.
(Tr. 12-14 p. 43)

Consequently, the issue of the sufficiency of

the evidence was raised at the trial court level.

The issue was

unquestionably raised for the trier of fact to consider.
Appellee argues that the evidence was sufficient to
convict

appellant

of

manslaughter.

Appellee

relies

on the

appellant's statement and the facts surrounding the shooting to
show that appellant was aware of the risk of death to another and
that he consciously disregarded that risk.

Appellee contends

that appellant admitted that he was aware that officers were in
the Bates1 house at the time of the shooting.
at p. 21)

(Brief of appellee

With respect to the gun shots, appellee's argument is

that the pattern of shots and the recorded sounds of gunfire that
were

introduced

into

evidence

indicate

shooting at people rather than the dogs.

that

appellant

was

(Brief of appellee at

pp. 22-23)
Agent Garcia, who took appellant's statement, testified
that appellant denied seeing people in the Bates' house (Tr. 12-9
p. 85). Appellant did admit that "at best he saw movement in the
Bate's house"

(Tr. 12-9 p. 79-80).

He had also stated that he

observed the door to that house open (Tr. 12-9 p. 79-80).
testified that appellant was questioned about the

Garcia

inferences

that could be drawn from observing the movement and the door
opening.

(Tr. 12-9 p. 85)

that appellant

It was in answering those questions

admitted his awareness of people being

in the

house.

Appellee does not mention in its brief that the agents

entered

the

Bates'

house

under

cover

of

darkness

and were

attempting to conceal their presence from the Singer-Swapp family
members.

(Tr. 12-7 pp. 7-14)

During the siege family members

were observed in and around the Bates' house.
237,

250-252)

These

facts

corroborate

(Tr. 12-2 pp. 235-

appellant's

lack of

awareness of the presence of the agents in that house.
Appellee

emphasizes

that

the pattern

of

bullet

strikes

indicates that appellant was not shooting at the dogs that had
been released.

Seven projectiles were located that were found to

-2-

have been fired from appellant's rifle.

Of those projectiles

four entered the door at the Bates' house when the door was
partially open.

(Tr. 12-13 pp. 251-252)

Those are the strikes

that make the pattern that appellee emphasizes.

The other three

strikes include one projectile that struck the Jeppson house and
was ultimately located in Agent Don Robert's coat.
17-32)

(Tr. 12-8 pp.

One projectile ricocheted off the south side of the

Bates' house and lodged in the Jeppson's automobile.

The last is

the projectile that struck and killed Lieutenant House.
13 pp. 245-247).

(Tr. 12-

The totality of the circumstances indicate that

the shots were spread over a four to five foot horizontal plane.
As discussed

in appellant's opening brief, the height of the

strikes of the projectiles is consistent with a person firing at
2
dogs

moving in the area in front of the Bates' house rather

than firing at people in that house.
Appellee also emphasizes the sequence of the shots as
reflected

in the videotape that was introduced

into evidence.

(Exhibit E-4)

The grouping of the shots is correctly described

in

brief.

appellee's

This

evidence

must

be

considered

in

conjunction with all of the other evidence introduced at trial.
As indicated by appellee, the first series, three shots, would
have

involved the projectiles that struck the Jeppson house,

See the diagram of the Bate's house in the addendum of
appellant's opening brief.
o
See appellant's opening brief at page 18.

-3-

ricocheted off the Bates' house and struck Lieutenant House. The
second series, four shots, would have involved those projectiles
that struck the door of the Bates' house.

That sequence would be

consistent with appellant shooting at a dog standing at a point
higher in elevation than the doorway.

If appellant would have

been aiming at a lethal level the projectiles would have struck
about fourteen inches higher than that level.

This is because

the sighting of the rifle, as described by Agent Crum, would have
resulted in appellant's firing higher than his aim.
p. 295)

(Tr. 12-13,

With this in mind, appellant would have had to been

aiming at a point that would be in a person's upper leg area,
rather than the lethal or upper body level described by appellee.
Such a point would have been at the approximate height of the
dogs.
Appellee contends that appellant was shooting at the
agents in the Bate's house when he fired his rifle on January 28,
1988.

However, considering the totality of the evidence that

contention

is

improbable.

It

is much more

reasonable

that

appellant was shooting at the dogs that were loosed to arrest the
Swapp brothers.

Likewise, the evidence

is

inconclusive

and

improbable as to appellant's awareness of the presence of agents
in

the

Bates'

awareness.
in

the

Singer

and

and

his

conscious

disregard

of

that

The evidence indicated that the agents had never been

Bates'

themselves

house

house

before.

The

agents

tried

to

secret

in the house and not reveal their presence to the
Swapp

families.

(Tr. 12-7, p. 7-14)

-4-

The best

evidence of appellant's awareness was that he observed the door
open and saw movement in the Bates' house.

(Tr. 12-9, • pp. 79-

80)

Appellant denied seeing people in the house.

(Tr. 12-9, p.

85)

At most, this evidence shows that appellant either failed to

perceive or failed to recognize the risk of firing his rifle
toward the Bates' house.

In failing to perceive or recognize a

risk, the appellant could be guilty of negligent homicide.
v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142 (Utah, 1983).

State

The situation in this case

is indistinguishable from that in Dyer.
fired his rifle inside of his home.

In Dyer the defendant
He was aware that his

girlfriend was in the house, but was unaware that she was behind
the

wall

at

which

he

fired

the

rifle.

The

defendant

was

convicted of negligent homicide, and that conviction was affirmed
on appeal.
The evidence in this case is sufficiently inconclusive
and improbable that reasonable minds would entertain a reasonable
doubt

that the offense of manslaughter has been established.

Consequently, that conviction must be reversed.

State v. Booker,

709 P.2d 342 (Utah, 1985).
POINT II
APPELLANT'S STATEMENTS TO LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENTS MADE SUBSEQUENT TO HIS ARREST WERE
INADMISSIBLE.
A.
APPELLANT'S STATEMENTS
MADE VOLUNTARILY.

-5-

WERE

NOT

Appellee fails to address the issue raised by appellant
with

respect

to

the

voluntariness

of

the

confession.

The

position taken by appellant was that due to his particular mental
condition

and

individual.

circumstances, appellant

was a very vulnerable

(Brief of appellant at pp. 27-30)

The statements

and actions of the officers exploited that vulnerability in such
a manner that the appellant's statements were not the product of
a free and rational will.

See:

Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104

(1985).
Appellee's

tactic

was

to

address

each

factor

individually and argue that factor in and of itself does not make
the confession involuntary.

Such a procedure is improper because

the case law requires that the evidence must be considered in its
totality.

State

Circumstances

that

v.
may

Strain,
be

729

P.2d

considered

in

221

(Ut.

determining

1989)
the

voluntariness of a confession include the age and intelligence of
the defendant, the circumstances that invoked the conversation
and

the nature,

import

and

content of

statement.

State v.

Johnson, 83 P.2d 1010 (1938).
The critical aspect of the voluntariness of appellant's
statements are those circumstances that invoked the confession.
Of particular importance is the content of what appellee labels
3
the "casual conversation" between the agents and appellent.
By
getting

appellant

to talk

about

his

3
See:

Brief of appellant at pp. 28-29.

-6-

father, appellant

could

undoubtedly be lead into a conversation about the bombing and
4
shootout.
As discussed in appellant's opening brief this method
of questioning
particular

involved both trickery

appellant.

That

would

and coercion upon this
render

the

confession

involuntary and therefore inadmissible.
B.
THE AGENTS FAILED TO SCRUPULOUSLY
HONOR APPELLANT'S ASSERTION OF HIS
PRIVILEGE
AGAINST
SELF
INCRIMINATION.
Appellee correctly focuses on the issue of whether the
agents

scrupulously

privilege

against

honored

self

appellant's

incrimination.

assertion
Appellant

of
had

his
been

properly warned about his right to counsel and privilege against
self

incrimination.

He then signed a waiver.

Shortly after

signing a waiver, appellant indicated that he did not want to
talk to the agents.

(R. 1476, p. 202)

If the agents engaged in

interrogation of appellant then the assertion of the privilege
was not scrupulously honored.
(1986);

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436

Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
"Interrogation" was defined in Rhode Island v. Innis,

446 U.S. 291 (1980), as express questioning or its functional
equivalent.

The functional equivalent of questioning is defined

as words and actions by the officers that those officers should

See Point II. B., infra.

have known were
response.

reasonably

likely to elicit

an

incriminating

Appellee characterizes the exchange between the agents

and appellant as "casual conversation."

However, appellee never

discussed the content of those conversations.

Just because one

party characterizes a verbal exchange as "casual conversation"
does not make it such.

The court must look to the content of the

conversation to determine if it was merely something "casual" and
voluntary or if it was interrogation.
As previously discussed the agents talked about their
own families and expressed their confusion over the causes of the
entire situation.

(R. 1476, p. 216)

All of the communications

from the Singer household in the two previous weeks

related to

the death of appellant's father and how that incident related to
5
the revelations that inspired the bombing and siege.
Enticing
appellant into talking about his family in general and his father
in particular

would

reasonably

bombing, siege and the shooting.
reasonably

likely to elicit an

lead

to statements

about

the

Such a discussion would be
incriminating

response.

This

"casual conversation" was the functional equivalent of express
questioning.

This

"casual

interrogation as described

conversation"

in Innis.

was

therefore

The officers failed to

scrupulously honor appellant's assertion of his privilege against
self

incrimination.

The statements made as a result of that

interrogation were inadmissible.
5
See footnote 12 in Appellant's opening brief.
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Tu.r

evidence was insufficient

*

support

-a , v s

appe

L z

manslaugh to- ; - -iction
an'l '
court

:
impose

•.:. ^ :<.':* i:- t •. e district

' - * offense • t reo! < <*^* fr ^iricide.

*•.,: :•• • -

The stateme^*^ na-^
innc'ln

-

-i—f

--- 5 were

, ^ ;.:...... <_; x. v.v v,_i

shoulc r- reversed and

a n e w t rial o rd e ' e ? " c.»r ap^
DATED u n s

7X1

r

*:;,-.

^

^ / '

^

_

br.LivuKl

o:c^/ cert.**. *
Brief

-

FRED METOS #2250
YENGICH, RICH, XAIZ fc METOS
Attorneys for Appellant
175 East Fourth South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-0320

C E R T 11 . v._A__ .

fr-reg-. " - Reply

s

"*rrec - copy « ' < 1he

"

A- r ^" ,•

ir|... ., i
•*y o« ; i t i u

: -:

-- *-

*

ia' ,

i.

-

cil

2 36
•' |

State
day

ol

